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The 30th of January 2019 will undoubtedly be remembered as a milestone day in the
development of Slovak constitutional law, signaling the start of a new, second, stage
of development. The first stage started on 1 September 1992 (the day of adoption
of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic) and lasted until 30 January 2019. The
second stage started with the Slovak Constitutional Court decision, of 30 January
2019, that an amendment to the Constitution is invalid for violating the material core
of the Constitution.
Brief Summary of the Case
The proceedings before the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, the result
of which is the breakthrough decision in question, began in 2014 when the part of
the Slovak Constitution dealing with judicial power was significantly amended. This
constitutional amendment was followed by an amendment to the Act on Judges,
implementing legislation, relating to the relevant part of the Constitution. In addition
to other changes, the most important change introduced by the constitutional
amendment in question was a requirement that judges be issued with security
clearance – clearance issued by the National Security Authority (one of the executive
branch bodies), following checks by that authority. The Judicial Council, the supreme
authority on the legitimacy of the judiciary in the Slovak Republic, would have to
assess judges’ fitness for office on the basis of these security clearances. The
primary reason the constitutional amendment was challenged before the Court was
because the security clearances would be required also for judges already holding
office, and not only for new candidates standing for judicial office.
A little more than four years after the beginning of the litigation challenging the
constitutionality of these amendments, the Constitutional Court finally handed down
its decision. Deciding not only on the constitutionality of the amendment to the Act of
Judges, but also on the constitutionality of the amendment to the Constitution itself.
The Court ruled that part of the 2014 constitutional amendment is contrary to article
1(1) of the Constitution. This article establishes the Slovak Republic as a democratic
state and as a state based on the principle of rule of law. The commitment to
democracy and the rule of law incorporates, according to the opinion of the Court, a
commitment to the principle of division of powers and the principle of independence
of the judiciary. These principles were held by the Constitutional Court to form part of
the material core of the Slovak Constitution. The Court found that not only “ordinary”
acts of the parliament but also its constitutional amendments must be in accordance
with the material core of the Constitution. Thus, the Constitutional Court in effect
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“created” a power to assess the conformity of constitutional amendments with the
Constitution, a power which is not explicitly written in the text of the Constitution.
Material Core of Slovak Constitution
Whether or not the Constitution of the Slovak Republic can be regarded as having
a material core has long been a topic of debate among Slovakian constitutional
scholars. Some authors argued that the Slovak Constitution does not expressly
provide that any part of it cannot be amended, and therefore that it has no material
core. Others argued that the Slovak Constitution does have what might be called
an implicit material core. If one accepted the existence of an implicit material core,
that raised the problem of identifying the provisions of the Constitution that form
this material core. The commitment to democracy and the rule of law (which are
expressed in article 1(1) of the Constitution) were often put forward as likely to
be regarded as the material core. The Constitutional Court itself has repeatedly,
previously, noted the Constitution potentially had a material core, and to article
1(1) as its likely basis (for example, in a 2017 decision on abolition of presidential
amnesties); clear confirmation of the priority of article 1(1) (as the material core) over
other constitutional norms was however lacking.
Consequences of the Decision of the Constitutional
Court
The Constitutional Court’s decision has been handed down just as public debate
is focused on the process currently underway for the appointment of 9 new judges
to the Constitutional Court itself (18 candidates are being considered for 9 vacant
positions). In particular the focus has been on whether or not one of the candidates,
former Prime Minister Robert Fico, meets the requirements for the number of years
in legal practice that would make him eligible for consideration for a seat on the
court. In such an atmosphere, the decision of the Court in question will either be
mightily praised, or strongly criticized by constitutional academics, and probably
within a very short time span. What is certain is that the decision will not be left
without a response. While one could not possibly anticipate all consequences of
such a breakthrough decision today, I will attempt to name just a few.
An immediate consequence is that the legislature will have to determine how it will
implement the finding of unconstitutionality. The Slovakian legal framework currently
only outlines the process for how parliament deals with the unconstitutionality of
an “ordinary” act of parliament. One possibility is that the National Council (the
parliament of the Slovak Republic), as a constitution-making authority, might be
required to “repair” the Constitution within a six-month period, as it would do as a
lawmaker in the case of correction of the unconstitutionality of “ordinary” acts of
parliament.
Another consequence is the need to deal with the change from the classical
dichotomy of a constitutional norm and an ordinary legal norm, into a new three-
dimensional structure. The structure consisting of: (1) norms forming part of the
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material core of the Constitution, (2) other constitutional norms, and (3) ordinary
legal norms. The second category (other constitutional norms) is still the criterion for
determining the constitutionality for the third category (ordinary legal norms). Since
30 January 2019 however, it has also become possible to review the constitutionality
of the second category – with the first category (norms of the material core of the
Constitution) the criterion for determining constitutionality. The problem of identifying
the constitutional provision that underlies the norms of the first category is now
overcome. The form of the legislation in which a norm is contained, is sufficient
for identifying whether it falls within the second or the third category. Determining
whether legislation aimed at constitutional amendment falls foul of the norms in the
first category, however, will depend on the substantive content of the legislation.
Something that will impact on this determination is the fact that the Constitutional
Court did not define the content of the material core of the Constitution exhaustively.
The Court only held that the commitment to democracy and the rule of law form the
basis of the material core.
A consequence of the decision, which may however only be felt further down the
line, will be a possible change in relationship between the Constitutional Court and
the National Council. If the Constitutional Court is able to review the constitutionality
of a constitutional amendment by the parliament, this presents an important change
in the hierarchy of supremacy of state authorities. The Constitutional Court, on
matters relating to the material core, has more authority than the National Council,
which is defined by the Constitution as a legislative and constitution-making
authority. If this trend of empowerment of the Constitutional Court and its judicial
activism should continue, we could legitimately ask whether the commitment
to democracy is really still being honoured. It might, in fact, be a case of the
commitment to democracy being undermined in favour of the principle of rule of law,
which is also expressed in article 1(1) of the Constitution. This denial, or at least
a reduction in the importance of the commitment to democracy, is related to the
way in which judges are appointed. The greatest weakness of the Constitutional
Court, which is often raised in conflicts between the Court and the parliament, is the
absence of any direct democratic legitimacy of the Court. Unlike the members of the
National Council, the judges of the Constitutional Court are not elected directly by
the People.
This post has previously appeared on the IACL AICL blog and is republished here
with kind permission.
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